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We document a negative and convex relationship between hedge fund size and future risk-
adjusted returns. Small hedge funds outperform large hedge funds by 3.65 percent per year after 
adjusting for risk. This over performance is not driven by fund age, leverage, serial correlation, 
or self-selection biases. The capacity constraints manifest across various investment styles and 
regions. In particular, they are strongest for funds managed by multiple principals who trade 
small, illiquid securities, suggesting that the observed diseconomies can be traced to price impact 
and hierarchy costs (Stein, 2002). While investors direct disproportionately more capital to 
smaller funds, they do not do so quickly enough to eliminate this size effect. Interestingly, the 
capacity constraints facing individual hedge funds do not extend to funds of hedge funds.   
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1. Introduction 
 
 How significant and pervasive are the capacity constraints facing individual hedge funds? 
Do small hedge funds deliver economically larger risk-adjusted returns than do large hedge 
funds? Which hedge funds are most affected by capacity constraints and why? The answers to 
these questions are relevant to investors and have important implications for performance 
persistence and the existence of incentive fees.  
 Recent studies have shed light on capacity constraints in the mutual fund industry (Chen, 
et al. 2004; Yan, 2008). However, unlike mutual funds, hedge funds typically trade complex and 
illiquid securities, including derivatives and over-the-counter securities. They exploit limited 
arbitrage opportunities through dynamic strategies that involve speed, leverage, and attention to 
execution costs. It seems that the impact of fund size, if any, should be amplified for hedge 
funds. Indeed, the widespread use of incentive fees by hedge fund management companies 
suggests that hedge fund investment opportunities are not as scalable as those for mutual funds 
(Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross, 2003). As a result of possible diseconomies of scale, several 
successful hedge funds have stopped accepting new money. Some hedge funds that have ignored 
such scalability issues have perished (Lowenstein, 2001). Clearly, the hedge fund industry 
provides an interesting laboratory for studying the effects of diseconomies of scale on fund 
management.   
 Yet, the evidence in favor of capacity constraints in the hedge fund industry appears 
mixed. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) find that successful funds are less likely to accept 
new money while Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008) show that inflows hurt the ability of 
Funds of Funds to deliver alpha. Naik, Ramadorai, and Stromqvist (2007) document investment 
strategy level capacity constraints. However, none of these studies focus on the fundamental 
relationship between fund assets under management and future fund performance. An exception 
is Getmansky (2005) who finds a positive and concave relationship between fund size and future 
performance; hedge funds initially benefit from an increase in fund size, but investment 
performance suffers once funds grow beyond a certain optimal level. Yet, given the logic of Berk 
and Green (2004), Getmansky’s results1 seem inconsistent with the dearth of performance 
                                                 
1 We show that Getmansky’s results are sensitive to the model of self selection and termination that she uses.  
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persistence for hedge funds (Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, 1999; Liang, 2000; Agarwal and 
Naik, 2000). Hence, we believe that the topic of capacity constraints in the hedge fund industry 
deserves a fresh look. 
 In this effort, we investigate the effects of fund size on the cross-section of future fund 
performance. We find using a Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression framework that the 
relationship between past fund size and fund performance is downward sloping and convex. 
Specifically, we estimate cross-sectional regressions on monthly fund abnormal returns with last 
month’s fund size and square of fund size as independent variables. The regressions control for a 
kitchen sink of fund characteristics that may affect fund performance, and allow for style and 
investment region fixed effects. We adjust for hedge fund risk exposure using the Fung and 
Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model which has been shown to have considerable explanatory power 
over aggregate hedge fund returns. We find that the coefficient estimate on last month’s fund 
size is negative and statistically significant (t-statistic = 2.54) while that on the square of last 
month’s fund size is positive and statistically significant (t-statistic = 2.26). After controlling for 
the other variables, an increase in fund assets under management (henceforth AUM) from a 
small base of say US$10m to US$500m is associated with a reduction in annual abnormal 
returns of approximately 1.23 percent. As a manifestation of the convexity, a subsequent increase 
in fund AUM from US$500m to US$1bn is associated with additional reduction in risk-adjusted 
returns of only 0.57 percent. 
 Next, we evaluate the economic relevance of the capacity constraints by employing the 
portfolio sort methodology used by Carhart (1997) and others. We show that the portfolio of 
small funds outperforms the portfolio of large funds by about 3.65 percent per year (t-statistic = 
6.64) after adjusting for covariation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven risk factors.2 The 
portfolios are formed every January 1st based on fund AUM last December. These results cannot 
be explained by self-selection induced backfill and incubation database biases (Fung and Hsieh, 
2004), illiquidity induced serial correlation in returns, and differences in fund fees. The portfolio 
spread is still consistently above two percent per year and statistically significant (at the one 
percent level) regardless of whether we perform the sort analysis after removing the first 36 
                                                 
2 We define as small funds those in the smallest two size quintiles and as large funds those in the largest two size 
quintiles. 
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months of return data for each fund, after unsmoothing the returns using the Getmansky, Lo, and 
Makarov (2004) approach, or after adding back fees to the post-fee returns. 
 Can hedge fund investors benefit by choosing small funds instead of large funds? Since 
investors cannot short sell hedge funds (at least those funds that are not publicly listed), spread 
portfolios of hedge funds may not be particularly relevant to them. Hence, we consider the 
performance of a hypothetical Fund of Funds portfolio with the typical fee structure of one 
percent management fee and ten percent performance fee, and that only invests in small hedge 
funds. We show that this hypothetical Fund of Funds delivers an after-fee alpha of 3.99 percent 
per year (t-statistic = 3.97), which is both economically and statistically significant. In contrast, 
the hypothetical Fund of Funds portfolio comprising only large hedge funds earns an after-fee 
alpha of 1.32 percent per year that is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Our results are 
robust to requiring that the Fund of Funds invests only in small hedge funds that manage at least 
US$20 million. 
 What drives capacity constraints for hedge funds and how pervasive are they? We break 
down our fund universe into four broad investment styles (Security selection, Directional 
Traders, Relative Value, and Multi-process) and four investment regions (North America, 
Europe, Global, and Emerging Markets). We find that the portfolio sort results are robust across 
investment styles and regions. However, the spread alphas demonstrate substantial variation. For 
example, the spread alphas are relatively weak for Relative Value (1.86 percent) and Global 
(2.71 percent) funds who typically trade liquid and large-capitalization securities. Conversely, 
they are relatively strong for Emerging Market (8.02 percent) funds who typically trade illiquid 
and small-capitalization securities. These results suggest that price impact may lie at the root of 
the observed capacity constraints. Large hedge funds are likely to generate greater price impact 
with their trades than do small hedge funds as they attempt to deploy large amounts of capital in 
the markets. Moreover, the effects of price impact are especially severe for small capitalization 
and illiquid securities. Consistent with this view, we find that the capacity constraints are 
strongest for funds that by virtue of their tight share restrictions (long redemption and 
notification periods) are likely to hold more illiquid securities (Aragon, 2007).  
 We also show that the capacity constraints are related to the organization diseconomies 
proposed by Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Stein (2002). They argue that the process of agents 
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jostling to get ideas implemented in large organizations can create diseconomies of scale.3 
According to Stein (2002), such diseconomies or hierarchy costs are particularly relevant when 
tasks involve the processing of soft information, e.g., information that cannot be verified by 
anyone but the agent. Chen et al. (2004) and Berger et al. (2005) find evidence of hierarchy costs 
in mutual funds and banks, respectively. Since the investment management process at hedge 
funds very often involves soft information, i.e., subjective opinions as to whether a security is 
over or under-valued, hierarchy costs should impact hedge fund performance as well.  We show 
that consistent with this line of reasoning, the number of principals compounds the effects of size 
on hedge fund performance. Specifically, the alpha spread between small and large funds is 
almost 1.5 times for multi-principal funds as it is for single-principal funds.  
 Are hedge fund managers cognizant ex-ante of the diseconomies of scale that they will 
face? Evidence suggests that they are. We find that funds who are most affected by capacity 
constraints set higher performance fees and lower management fees than do funds who are least 
affected by capacity constraints. Funds who will potentially struggle with significant capacity 
issues benefit from high performance fees as such incentive fees allow fund managers to extract 
rents while curtailing asset growth and side-stepping diseconomies of scale. Conversely, funds 
who by the nature of their investment strategies eschew capacity issues are able to grow their 
assets without hurting future performance and can benefit from setting high management fees. 
Since hedge fund management contracts are inked prior to fund inception, it is likely that 
managers understand in advance, perhaps through past trading experience, the severity of 
capacity issues that they will face.  
 Do hedge fund investors direct more capital towards smaller hedge funds? If so, why 
does the size effect persist over time? We show that smaller funds attract disproportionately 
larger inflows than do larger funds even after controlling for the better performance of the 
former. Further, consistent with Berk and Green (2004), these fund inflows crimp the future 
performance of small funds. Small funds that subsequently experience above-median inflows 
underperform small funds that do not by 5.82 percent per year after adjusting for risk. However, 
these inflows do not erode performance quickly enough to eliminate the size effect. The alpha of 
the spread between the small and large fund portfolios falls from 3.64 percent to 2.49 percent per 
                                                 
3 This line of research follows from theoretical work by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and 
Hart (1995). They argue that agents who lack control over allocation decisions face weaker incentives.  
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annum when we wait 12 months before evaluating performance, but remains statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. One view is that fund share restrictions, such as lock-ups and 
redemption notification periods, prevent hedge fund investors from swiftly redeploying capital 
from large to small funds and taking full advantage of the size effect. 
 Thus far our analysis has focused on single-manager4 hedge funds. When we run the 
same portfolio analysis for Funds of Funds we find that the spread is -0.46 percent per year. That 
is large Funds of Funds outperform small Funds of Funds. While the alpha spread is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, it underscores the difference between single-manager hedge funds 
and Funds of Funds. Large Funds of Funds may be able to leverage on their size and negotiate 
for better terms with their underlying hedge funds or invest in successful hedge funds that are 
otherwise closed to new investors. The Fund of Funds results also shed light on an alternative, 
agency-based explanation for the diseconomies of scale facing single-manager hedge funds. 
Specifically, large single-manager funds may under perform small single-manager funds simply 
because fund managers do not care as much about maximizing returns after their funds reach a 
certain size. Since single-manager hedge funds and Funds of Funds face similar incentive 
structures5, this agency-based story does not explain why we do not observe similar 
diseconomies with Funds of Funds. Conversely, the price impact story squares with the lack of 
capacity constraints for these funds. Since large Funds of Funds are composed of the smaller 
distinct portfolios run by their underlying hedge funds, they should be less affected by the 
liquidity costs associated with trading a large portfolio. Moreover, hierarchy costs are less 
relevant for Funds of Funds since the single-manager hedge funds within a Fund of Funds 
portfolio do not have to make coordinated investment decisions or compete directly with one 
another for assets.   
 Overall, the results suggest that hedge fund managers grapple with significant 
diseconomies of scale. In doing so, we build on several recent themes. In particular, our results 
complement earlier work on hedge fund performance persistence. Brown, Goetzmann, and 
Ibbotson (1999), Liang (2000), and Agarwal and Naik (2000) find that hedge fund performance 
does not persist at annual horizons. Berk and Green (2004) argue that even if fund managers 
possess investment skills, their future performance will deteriorate if fund flows chase returns 
                                                 
4 Single-manager hedge funds refer to funds managed by a single management company. Hedge fund management 
companies may be run by one or multiple principals.  
5 This incentive structure consists of an AUM-based management fee and a return-based performance fee.  
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and capacity constraints are binding. Our work on capacity constraints helps us understand why 
hedge fund performance persistence, at least based on standard performance measures, remains 
elusive. More recently, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007) propose alternative Bayesian 
performance measures for hedge funds and find substantial evidence of performance persistence 
especially with Funds of Funds.6 Our results on Funds of Funds dovetail nicely with their 
findings. Since we find that size constraints are more relevant to individual hedge funds than to 
Funds of Funds, it is less likely that stellar Fund of Funds performance will be eroded away by 
asset growth.  
 We also extend work by Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) on hedge fund 
management contracts. They conjecture that the use of incentive fees is due to decreasing returns 
to scale in the industry. We refine the link between capacity constraints and incentive fees. Our 
results suggest that fund managers who face significant capacity constraints set higher 
performance fees and lower management fees as they cannot grow assets without hurting future 
returns. Our analysis corroborates the Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) view that the 
compensation structure in the fund management industry provides a key signal of how future 
returns depend on the amount of money chasing after limited opportunities.  
 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
presents the main empirical results. A series of robustness tests follow in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Data 
 
 We evaluate the size and performance relationship of hedge funds using monthly net-of-
fee7 returns and assets under management (henceforth AUM) data of live and dead hedge funds 
reported in the TASS and HFR datasets between January 1994 to June 2008 – a time period that 
covers both market upturns and downturns, as well as relatively calm and turbulent periods. 
Since TASS and HFR started distributing their data in 1994, the datasets do not contain 
information on funds that died before December 1993. This gives rise to survivorship bias. We 
mitigate this bias by focusing on January 1994 onward data. 
                                                 
6 See the decile spread alphas in their Table 7. 
7 Our results are robust to using pre-fee returns. 
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 In our fund universe, we have a total of 4,556 live hedge funds and 5,442 dead hedge 
funds. However, due to concerns that funds with multiple share classes may cloud the analysis, 
we exclude duplicate share classes from the sample.8 This leaves us with a total of 3,177 live 
hedge funds and 4,240 dead hedge funds. The breakdown of funds by database is illustrated in 
Figure 1. The Venn diagram in Figure 1 reveals that the funds are roughly evenly split between 
TASS and HFR. While there is some overlap between the two databases, there are many funds 
that belong to only one database. For example, there are 2,376 funds and 2,920 funds peculiar to 
the TASS and HFR databases, respectively. This highlights the advantage of obtaining our funds 
from more than one data source. 
[Please insert Figure 1 here] 
 Other than monthly return and size information, our sample also captures data on fund 
characteristics such as management fee, performance fee, redemption frequency, notification 
period, lock-up period, investment style, investment geographical region, fund leverage 
indicator, fund family, and fund minimum investment. These fund characteristics are recorded in 
year 2008 and, for our purposes we take these characteristics as constant over the sample period. 
Since minimum investments are sometimes quoted in currencies other than U.S. dollar, we 
convert all minimum investments to U.S. dollars using exchange rates on 30 June 2008, so as to 
facilitate meaningful comparison. 
 Following Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), we classify funds into four broad 
investment styles: Security Selection, Multi-process, Directional Trader, and Relative Value. 
Security Selection funds take long and short positions in undervalued and overvalued securities, 
respectively, and reduce systematic risks in the process. Usually, they take positions in equity 
markets. Multi-process funds employ multiple strategies that take advantage of opportunities 
created by significant transactional events, such as spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions, 
bankruptcy reorganizations, recapitalizations, and share buybacks. Directional Trader funds bet 
on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, equities, and bonds in the futures 
and cash market. Relative Value funds take positions on spread relations between prices of 
financial assets and aim to minimize market exposure. Table 1 breaks down the funds in our 
sample by investment strategy and reports the size distribution as well as the number of live and 
dead funds in each strategy.  
                                                 
8 Inferences do not change when we include multiple share classes of the same fund in the analysis 
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[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 We recognize that hedge fund data are susceptible to many biases (Fung and Hsieh, 
2000). These biases stem from the fact that, due to the lack of regulation amongst hedge funds, 
inclusion in hedge fund databases is voluntary. As a result, there is a self-selection bias. For 
instance, funds often undergo an incubation period where they rely on internal funding before 
seeking capital from outside investors. Incubated funds with successful track records then go on 
to list in various hedge fund databases while the unsuccessful funds do not, resulting in an 
incubation bias.  Separate from this, when a fund is listed on a database, it often includes data 
prior to the listing date. Again, since successful funds have a strong incentive to list and attract 
capital inflows, these backfilled returns tend to be higher than the non-backfilled returns. In the 
analysis that follows, we will repeat the tests after dropping the first 36 months of return data 
from each fund so as to ensure that the results are robust to backfill and incubation bias.   
 
 
3. Empirical results 
 
A. Size and the cross-section of fund alpha 
 
 To investigate the cross-sectional relationship between fund size and fund performance, 
we estimate Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions on monthly hedge fund alpha with lagged fund 
size as an independent variable. Specifically, we first run cross-sectional regressions for each 
month. Then, we report the time series averages of the coefficient estimates, and use the time-
series standard errors of the average slopes to draw inferences. The Fama-MacBeth methodology 
is a convenient and conservative way of accounting for potential cross-correlation in residuals. 
According to Fama and French (2002), Fama-MacBeth standard errors are often two to five 
times the OLS standard errors from pooled panel regressions that ignore cross-correlation. 
 Throughout this paper, we model the risks of hedge funds using the Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) seven-factor model. The set of factors comprises: the excess return on the S&P 500 index 
(SNPMRF); a small minus big factor (SCMLC) constructed as the difference between the 
Wilshire small and large capitalization stock indices; the yield spread of the U.S. 10-year 
 10
Treasury bond over the three month Treasury bill, adjusted for duration of the 10-year bond 
(BD10RET); the change in the credit spread of Moody’s BAA bond over the 10-year Treasury 
bond, also appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), and the excess returns on portfolios 
of lookback straddle options on currencies (PTFSFX), commodities (PTFSCOM), and bonds 
(PTFSBD), which are constructed to replicate the maximum possible return on trend following 
strategies on their respective underlying assets. These seven factors have been shown by Fung 
and Hsieh (2004) to have considerable explanatory power on hedge fund returns. Agarwal and 
Naik (2004) present a factor model for hedge funds that includes some of the factors of the Fung 
and Hsieh (2004) model.  
 Following Carhart (1997), we first calculate monthly fund abnormal return or alpha as 
fund excess returns minus the factor realizations times loadings estimated over the entire sample 
period. Hence, we have  
 
)
10(
miMmiMmiM
miMmiMmiMmiMimim
PTFSCOMhPTFSFXgPTFSBDf
BAAMTSYeRETBDdSCMLCcSNPMRFbrALPHA
+++
+++−≡
   (1) 
 
where i = 1, …, nfunds, m = 1,…,M, imALPHA  is the abnormal return of fund i for month m, imr  
is fund return in excess of the risk free rate. To facilitate the estimation of fund alpha, we only 
include results for funds with at least 24 months of return data.9 
 Next we estimate the following Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions: 
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9 Similar results obtain for funds with at least 36 months of return data. Results are available upon request. 
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where FUNDSIZE is fund size or fund AUM, FAMSIZE is fund family size10, PERFFEE is fund 
performance fee, MGTFEE is fund management fee, REDEMP is fund redemption period, 
MININV is minimum investment amount, FUNDAGE is fund age, STYLEDUM is investment 
style dummy, and GEODUM is investment region dummy.  
 We include the square of FUNDSIZE and FAMSIZE to capture potential non-linearities in 
the fund size and performance relationship.11 The annual fund characteristic variables (i.e., fees, 
redemption period, minimum investments, fund age, investment style, and investment region) are 
included in the Eq. 3 regression as control variables to account for their potential impact on fund 
performance. For example, Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) show that funds with more high 
powered incentives deliver higher returns than do other funds. Aragon (2007) argues that funds 
with longer redemption periods may take on greater liquidity risk and achieve higher expected 
returns. Finally, managers of younger funds may outperform managers of older funds, regardless 
of the amount of assets they manage, simply because they are more driven. It is important to 
control for the effects of fund age when analyzing the capacity constraints facing the industry 
since younger funds typically also manage fewer assets.  
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
 The coefficient estimates on the fund size variables reported in Table 2 reveal a strong 
negative and convex relationship between last month’s fund AUM and this month’s fund 
abnormal return.12 They indicate that after controlling for the other variables, an increase in 
AUM from a small base of say US$10m to US$500m is associated with a reduction in annual 
abnormal returns of approximately )11.0*5.026.0*5.0(*12 2− or 1.23 percent. For comparison, 
an increase in AUM from US$10m to US$1bn is associated with a decrease in alpha of 
approximately 1.80 percent per year and not 2.46 percent as a linear relationship would suggest. 
This highlights the convexity of the relationship between fund size and performance. We note 
that both the coefficient estimates on the fund size variables are statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. Interestingly, the coefficient estimate on the fund family variable is negative and 
statistically significant for the regression without controls but is statistically indistinguishable 
from zero once we control for the other fund characteristics. This contrasts with Chen et al. 
                                                 
10 For each fund, fund family size is the sum of the AUM for all the other funds within the same fund family as the 
fund. 
11 Inferences do not change when we replace the size and size squared variables with the logarithm of size. 
12 The results also hold when we estimate the regressions on raw fund returns. 
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(2004) who find significant economies of scale at the family level for mutual funds. We believe 
that one reason for the difference may be that hedge fund families are more specialized in their 
investment process than are mutual fund families. As a result, individual hedge funds within a 
family are more likely to hold similar securities or engage in similar arbitrage opportunities. This 
ameliorates the potential family level economies of scale that come from reduced trading 
commissions and lending fees.   
 To illustrate the fund size and performance relationship, we sort fund monthly return and 
past AUM observations by AUM into 100 bins. Next, we plot the average monthly returns of the 
funds in each bin with their average past month’s AUM. The resultant scatter plot of Figure 2 
nicely summarizes the findings of Table 2. The downward sloping polynomial line of best fit 
drawn through the scatter plot is steeper in the region of small funds and gentler in the region of 
large funds, highlighting the convexity of the size and risk-adjusted performance relationship. 
This sharply contrasts with the concave relationship documented by Getmansky (2005) for size 
and raw fund performance.  
[Please insert Figure 2 here] 
 There are concerns that the results may be due to differences in the way backfill and 
incubation bias affects small versus large. If small funds backfill or incubate their returns while 
large funds do not, it may explain the overperformance of the former group of funds. Also, there 
are concerns that small funds may trade illiquid securities. As a result, for these funds, reported 
returns tend to be smoother than true economic returns, which understates volatility and 
overstates the statistical significance of risk-adjusted measures like alpha. To cater for such 
concerns, we re-estimate the regressions with backfill and incubation bias-adjusted alpha and 
with alpha derived from unsmoothed returns using the Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) 
correction.13 To adjust for backfill and incubation bias, we remove the first 36 months of return 
data from each fund and redo the alpha estimation for funds with at least 24 months of remaining 
return data. Lastly, to ensure that the underperformance of large funds is not simply due to their 
higher fees, we also re-do the analysis on pre-fee14 alpha. The results from this robustness 
analysis are presented in columns three to eight of Table 2, and suggest that the overperformance 
                                                 
13 We use the average values of ,, 10 θθ and 2θ  for the various investment styles reported in their Table 8 to effect 
the correction. 
14 Pre-fee alphas are computed from pre-fee returns. We derive pre-fee returns by taking the high watermark and 
hurdle rate as the T-bill, and assuming that the returns accrue to a first-year investor in the fund.  
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of small hedge funds is not driven by backfill bias, incubation bias, illiquidity, or lower fund 
fees. The coefficient estimates on the FUNDSIZE variable are statistically significant and 
economically relevant for all specifications and for the regressions with and without controls. 
 One shortcoming of the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure is that while it accounts for 
correlations between observations on different funds in the same month, it does not account for 
correlation between observations on the same fund across different months. Petersen (2009) calls 
the latter the firm effect. According to him, standard errors clustered by firm (Rogers, 1993) are 
unbiased and produce correctly sized confidence intervals whether the firm effect is permanent 
or temporary. The firm effect may be present in hedge fund data given that hedge fund returns 
are often serially correlated. To address this issue, we estimate the following pooled OLS 
regressions with standard errors clustered by fund.  
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where YRDUM is the year dummy and the other variables are as per defined earlier. We find that 
our results still hold when we adopt this alternate regression framework. Based on the clustered 
standard errors, the coefficient estimate on fund size is negative and statistically significant (t-
statistic = 2.99). Conversely, the coefficient estimate on the square of fund size is positive and 
statistically significant (t-statistic = 2.42). 
 
B. The performance of portfolios sorted on fund size 
 
 To gauge the economic relevance of the capacity constraints facing hedge funds, we first 
construct portfolios of funds based on fund size and compare their risk-adjusted performance. 
Specifically, every January 1st, we form an equal-weighted portfolio of small funds (Portfolio A) 
and an equal-weighted portfolio of large funds (Portfolio B) based on AUM in December15 last 
year. We define as small funds those in the smallest two size quintiles. Conversely, we define as 
                                                 
15 Recognizing that AUM data are often reported with a one month lag, we also sort funds every January 1st based on 
AUM in November of last year and find that the results are only marginally weaker.  
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large funds those in the largest two size quintiles.16 Next, we evaluate the performance of the 
portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model over the next 12 months. The alpha of the 
spread between Portfolios A and B represents the value added to investors of investing in small 
hedge funds and avoiding large hedge funds.  
The results from this exercise are displayed in Panel A of Table 3. Consistent with the 
cross-sectional regression results, they reveal a negative relationship between fund size and 
performance. The strategy of investing in the small hedge funds and avoiding large funds yields 
a risk-adjusted return of 3.65 percent per year (t-statistic = 6.64). This suggests that size is 
detrimental to future performance. Can hedge fund investors benefit by choosing small funds 
instead of large funds? Since one cannot short sell hedge funds, we evaluate the performance of 
the small fund portfolio (portfolio A) after discounting the one percent management fee and ten 
percent performance fee charged by the typical Fund of Funds. We find that after fees, the 
hypothetical Fund of Funds portfolio comprising small hedge funds delivers an after-fee alpha of 
4.34 percent per year, which is both economically and statistically significant (t-statistic = 4.07). 
In contrast, the hypothetical Fund of Funds portfolio comprising large hedge funds only earns an 
after-fee alpha of 1.09 percent per year that is statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
 Consistent with the cross-sectional regression results, our findings are robust to 
adjustments for backfill and incubation bias, serial correlation in returns, and fund fees. All the 
spread alphas in Panels B, C, and D of Table 3 are at least 2 percent per year and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. It is reassuring to note that the portfolios returns (portfolios A 
and B) are well explained by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factor model. The adjusted R-squares 
for portfolios A and B are consistently not lower than 55 percent. 
 Figure 3 illustrates the results from the baseline portfolio sorts. It shows the monthly 
cumulative average residuals (henceforth CARs) from the portfolio of small funds (portfolio A) 
and the portfolio of large funds (portfolio B). CAR is the cumulative difference between a 
portfolio's excess return and its factor loadings (estimated over the entire sample period) 
multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) risk factors. The CARs in Figure 3 indicate that 
                                                 
16 The results are robust to defining small funds as funds with AUM below the median fund and defining large funds 
as funds with AUM above the median fund.  
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portfolio A consistently outperforms portfolio B over the entire sample period and suggest that 
the deleterious effects of fund size are not confined to a particular time period. 
 [Please insert Figure 3 here]  
 One concern is that small hedge funds may employ greater leverage and hence will 
mechanically outperform large hedge funds. This may well be the case if these small funds trade 
more aggressively in a bid to deliver greater returns and attract larger inflows. As a check, we 
compute the information ratio (alpha divided by tracking error) of the portfolios in Panel A of 
Table 3. We find that the annualized information ratios for portfolio A, portfolio B, and the 
spread are 1.78, 0.98, and 1.69, respectively. Since the information ratio adjusts for the 
additional volatility that leverage induces, the superior information ratio17 of the small fund 
portfolio indicates that its overperformance is not simply a by-product of higher leverage.  
 Are the documented size constraints pervasive across the investment strategies or unique 
to a specific strategy? To check whether the documented capacity constraints apply broadly to 
hedge funds, we break down the sort analysis by investment strategy. That is, we redo the sorts 
for each of our four broadly defined investment styles: security selection, directional traders, 
relative value, and multi-process. The spread alphas reported in Panels A – D of Table 4 are all 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level and indicate that the capacity issues are robust 
across investment strategies. However, variations across styles do exist. The performance 
differential between small and large funds is greatest for security selection (5.49 percent per 
year) and weakest for relative value (1.86 percent per year). One view is that relative value funds 
trade mostly liquid fixed income securities and hence are less affected by price impact issues.    
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
 Thus far the analysis has focused on single-manager hedge funds. However it may be 
instructive to separately analyze the size effect for Funds of Funds. This is because Funds of 
Funds invest in multiple hedge funds and do not manage a portfolio of securities. Hence they 
should be relatively immune to the price impact induced size constraints that plaque hedge funds. 
The results in Panel E of Table 4 are consistent with this line of reasoning. Small Funds of Funds 
do not outperform large Funds of Funds. In fact, large Funds of Funds deliver higher risk-
adjusted returns than small Funds of Funds (though the difference is statistically 
                                                 
17 Since the number of observations for each portfolio is the same, we can draw similar inferences by comparing the 
alpha t-statistics of the small and large fund portfolios.  
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indistinguishable from zero). Perhaps large Funds of Funds are able to capitalize on their greater 
bargaining power and gain access to successful single-manager hedge funds that are otherwise 
closed to new investments. Alternatively, Brown, Fraser, and Liang (2008) argue that large 
Funds of Funds are better able to bear the costs of the due diligence needed to select 
outperforming funds. In any case, following the logic of Berk and Green (2004), the lack of 
capacity constraints for Funds of Funds suggest that performance persistence should be strongest 
for Funds of Funds; since without such capacity constraints, inflows on the back of good 
performance no longer crimp future performance. The results in Panel E of Table 4 thus dovetail 
nicely with the strong evidence of performance persistence documented for Funds of Funds by 
Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007). They show in their Table 7 that the decile spread between fund 
portfolios sorted on past performance is most statistically significant for Funds of Funds. 
 
C.  Capacity constraints and price impact 
 
 Do the capacity constraints facing large hedge funds stem from the price impact of their 
trades? If so, then it must be the case that these capacity constraints are accentuated for funds 
that trade small and illiquid securities. This is because it is much harder to move funds in and out 
of small capitalization and illiquid securities without having price move against the trader.  
Conversely, it is significantly easier to shift funds in and out of large capitalization and liquid 
securities without changing prices. As a corollary to this, Carhart et al. (2002) show that small 
cap mutual funds can more effectively “lean for the tape” or ratchet up the price of their stock 
holdings with end-of-the-quarter purchases than can large cap mutual funds.  
 To test the hypothesis that the capacity constraints are driven by price impact effects, we 
redo the portfolio sort analysis on hedge funds stratified by the size and illiquidity of their 
underlying holdings. How does one distinguish between funds that trade small capitalization 
thinly-traded securities from funds that trade large capitalization frequently-traded securities 
without information on their underlying holdings? One way is to look at the geographical region 
that they invest in. For example, Emerging Market stocks tend to be smaller and more illiquid 
than Developed Market stocks. In this effort, we redo the analysis for funds investing in the 
North American, European, Global, and Emerging Market regions. The results reported in Table 
5 corroborate the price impact hypothesis. The alpha of the spread between the small Emerging 
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Market fund and large Emerging Market fund portfolios is 8.02 percent per year (t-statistic = 
3.12) and dwarfs the spread alphas for funds investing in the North American, European, and 
Global regions. Also given that global securities (e.g., components of the MSCI world indices) 
are the best capitalized and most frequently traded securities in the financial markets, and it is 
not surprising that the capacity constraints are weakest for funds investing in the Global region. 
The small Global fund portfolio only outperforms the large Global fund portfolio by 2.71 percent 
per year after adjusting for risk.  
[Please insert Tables 5 and 6 here] 
 To shed further light on the drivers behind the capacity constraints, we stratify hedge 
funds based on the liquidity of their underlying holdings, by using fund share restrictions as a 
proxy, and redo the portfolio analysis. It has been argued by Aragon (2007) and others that funds 
with long redemption periods tend to hold more illiquid securities than do funds with short 
redemption periods. Such share restrictions allow funds sufficient time with which to exit from 
their illiquid positions. The results in Table 6 are broadly supportive of the price impact story. 
They indicate that regardless of whether we use redemption frequency or redemption notification 
period to proxy for fund illiquidity, funds trading illiquid securities tend to experience greater 
capacity constraints than funds trading liquid securities. For example, the spread alpha for hedge 
funds that allow for frequent redemptions (every month at worst) is 3.34 percent per year while 
that for hedge funds that allow for less frequent redemptions (every quarter at best) is 4.24 
percent per year. Taken together, the results from Tables 5 and 6 suggest that price impact 
factors may lie at the root of the capacity constraints facing hedge funds.  
 
D.  Capacity constraints and hierarchy costs 
 
 Are organizational diseconomies also responsible for some of the capacity constraints 
that we observe for hedge funds? Chen et al. (2004) find that controlling for fund size, team 
managed mutual funds underperform single-manager mutual funds. They attribute this effect to 
the hierarchy costs proposed by Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Stein (2002). According to Stein 
(2002) the process of agents jostling to get their ideas implemented in large organizations can 
create diseconomies of scale especially when those ideas involve soft information, i.e., 
information that cannot be verified by anyone other than the agent herself. As a result of this 
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competition for resources amongst agents, the best ideas do not always get implemented as 
agents choose ex-ante to focus on ideas supported by hard information, which can be easily 
verified. Such organizational diseconomies follow in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1986), 
Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995) who argue that agents face weak incentives when they 
do not exercise control over the allocation of resources.  
 Since investment decisions at hedge funds often involve soft information, e.g., subjective 
opinions on whether a security is over or under-valued, we hypothesize that hierarchy costs can 
induce organization diseconomies in hedge funds as well. To test this, we redo the portfolio sorts 
for single principal hedge funds and for multi-principal hedge funds. Since only HFR includes 
principal information, we run this analysis for HFR funds only. Despite the reduced sample size, 
the findings reported in Table 7 are striking. For hedge funds managed by a single principal, the 
alpha spread between small and large hedge funds is 4.45 percent per year. For hedge funds 
managed by two principals, the alpha spread rises to 6.42 percent per year. When we analyze 
hedge funds managed by more than two principals, the alpha spread is also relatively high at 6.34 
percent per year. The difference in the strength of the capacity constraints for multi- versus 
single principal funds suggests that hierarchy costs exacerbate the diseconomies faced by large 
hedge funds.   
[Please insert Table 7 here] 
 
E. Capacity constraints and fund incentives 
 
 Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) argue that the existence of performance fees can 
be explained by the diseconomies of scale facing hedge funds. Because of capacity constraints, 
successful funds will want to curtail inflows if they wish to maintain their returns. With 
performance fees, investors can compensate managers based on their returns and not solely on 
the assets that their returns attract.  
 If hedge fund managers understand the severity of the capacity constraints that they face 
then they should structure their compensation contracts to accommodate those constraints. 
According to the Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) line of reasoning, hedge funds who run 
into substantial capacity constraints will find it advantageous to receive more of their 
compensation in the form of performance fees. Conversely, hedge funds who are less affected by 
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capacity constraints will find it in their best interests to receive more of their compensation in the 
form of management fees. Hence, on one hand, we should expect to find weak capacity 
constraints for asset gatherers or hedge funds with high management fees and low performance 
fees. One the other hand, we should expect to find strong capacity constraints for non-asset 
gatherers or hedge funds with low management fees and high performance fees.      
[Please insert Table 8 here] 
 We test this hypothesis by stratifying funds based on their management and performance 
fees, and leveraging on the portfolio sort framework of Table 3. The results in Table 8 are 
broadly consistent with Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) and the idea that hedge fund 
managers are cognizant of the capacity constraints that will they face prior to setting up the fund. 
The alpha spreads in Panels A and D of Table 8 indicate that fund managers who set high 
management fees or low performance fees typically do not experience significant diseconomies 
of scale. In contrast, the alpha spreads in Panels B and C of Table 8 suggest that fund managers 
who set low management fees or high performance fees typically have to contend with 
significant diseconomies of scale. For example, within the low performance fee group of funds 
(performance fee less than18 20 percent), small funds outperform large funds by a modest 0.90 
percent per year after adjusting for risk. In contrast, within the high performance fee group of 
funds (performance fee greater than or equal to 20 percent), small funds outperform large funds 
by 4.45 percent per year after adjusting for risk.  
 
F. Capacity constraints and hedge fund investors 
 
Are hedge fund investors aware of the capacity issues confronting hedge funds? Do they 
direct disproportionately more capital to smaller funds? If so, why does the size effect 
documented in this paper persist over time? 
To test whether hedge fund investors deploy more capital to small funds, we estimate the 
following Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions on fund flow: 
                                                 
18 Most hedge funds impose management and performance fees of 2 and 20 percent, respectively. Since we know 
that the majority of funds are affected by capacity constraints, we set the inequalities in Table 8 such that we have 
fewer funds in the low performance fee and high management fee groups. Inferences do not change when we omit 
funds with management and performance fees of 2 and 20 percent, respectively, from our sample.   
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where { }12,9,6,3∈L  is the maximum return lag in months, FUNDFLOW is monthly fund flow 
as a percentage of AUM, FUNDRET is monthly fund return, and the other variables are as per 
defined in Section 3A. We seek to explain monthly fund flow with last month’s fund AUM after 
controlling for past fund returns (averaged over the past 3, 6, 9, or 12 months), and other fund 
characteristics. We find that the coefficient estimate on FUNDSIZE is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level for all L. For example, the coefficient estimate on FUNDSIZE 
when the maximum return lag is 3 months (i.e., 3=L ) indicates that a one standard deviation 
decrease in fund AUM increases monthly fund flow by 0.06 standard deviations or by 0.78% 
after controlling for past quarter’s fund returns and other fund characteristics. It appears that 
hedge investors are aware of the superior performance of small funds and, consequently, direct 
more capital to these funds.  
Do these additional capital flows erode away the over performance of small hedge funds? 
Berk and Green (2004) argue that inflows should crimp the future performance.  When we 
perform two-pass sorts on past month’s fund AUM and this month’s fund flow, we find that the 
size effect is stronger for funds that attract less inflow. For funds who attract below-median flow, 
the alpha spread between the small and large fund portfolios is 5.30 percent per year (t-statistic = 
9.46). Conversely, for funds who attract above-median flow, the corresponding alpha spread is 
only 2.11 percent per year (t-statistic = 3.70). Moreover, small funds who receive above-median 
flow underperform small funds who do not receive such high inflows by 5.82 percent per year (t-
statistic = 9.56) after adjusting for risk. These results, which are available upon request, are 
consistent with the reasoning expounded by Berk and Green (2004). 
 Are the inflows large enough to completely eliminate the size effect? When we impose a 
gap between the formation and evaluation periods and redo the baseline portfolio sorts, we find 
that the alpha spread decays slowly as we lengthen the gap. Even if we wait 12 months before 
evaluation, the alpha spread is still 2.49 percent per year (t-statistic = 4.41). With a 18-month gap 
between formation and evaluation periods, the alpha spread shrinks further to 1.94 percent per 
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year but is still statistically significant at the 1 percent level (t-statistic = 3.49). Clearly, inflows 
hurt future performance but not enough to completely eliminate the size effect. One view is that 
hedge fund investors, stymied by fund share restrictions (lock-ups and notification periods), 
often cannot rapidly redeploy capital from larger funds to smaller funds. Also, to keep 
monitoring and due diligence costs down, rather than investing in several small funds, some 
investors with significant capital may prefer instead to invest in a few large funds. 
 
4. Robustness tests 
 
 In this section, we present robustness tests to evaluate the strength of our empirical 
results. One recurring concern is that the size effects may be caused by fund leverage. Small 
funds in their pursuit of high returns may take on more leverage. In our sort analysis, this will 
mechanically drive up the average risk-adjusted return of the small fund portfolio relative to that 
of the large fund portfolio. Still, as discussed in Section 3A, a comparison of the information 
ratios of the portfolios suggest that it is unlikely that leverage lies at the root of their performance 
differential. Nonetheless, to address any residual leverage related concerns, we perform the sort 
analysis for funds without leverage. We can do so as HFR and TASS include an indicator 
variable for leverage. The results reported in Panel A of Table 9 reaffirm our earlier conclusions 
that leverage does not drive the performance advantage of small funds. Small funds who eschew 
leverage outperform large funds who eschew leverage by 3.40 percent per year after adjusting 
for risk. While the performance differential is somewhat higher for funds who do employ 
leverage, the fact that the results still hold for funds who avoid leverage altogether make clear 
that leverage does not drive the bulk of the performance differential between small and large 
funds. 
[Please insert Table 9 here] 
 Yet another concern is that the results thus far may not be particularly relevant to large 
institutional investors as the performance differential may be driven entirely by the smallest of 
funds. Given the convex relationship documented in Figure 2, the effects of size may not be 
meaningful for the larger funds that institutional investors focus on. Specifically, large 
institutional investors may find it difficult to invest in small funds who manage less than a 
certain size cutoff. Hence in Panel B of Table 9, we report portfolio sort results for funds that 
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manage at least US$20 million. The results indicate that even with the size cutoff, the small fund 
portfolio trumps the large fund portfolio by a risk-adjusted 3.01 percent per year (t-statistic = 
6.34). In addition, assuming that the small fund portfolio is part of a Fund of Funds charging the 
typical 1 percent management fee and 10 percent performance fee, it will generate a statistically 
significant alpha of 3.52 percent per year after fees. This suggests that while the capacity 
constraints are less striking in the region of large funds, they are still economically meaningful 
for hedge fund investors. 
 A related concern is that our methodology of sorting funds into only two groups based on 
size may mask perverse non-linearities in the size and performance relationship. To address this 
issue, in Panel C of Table 9, we report the performance of quintiles portfolios sorted on last 
December’s AUM. The results are strongly consistent with capacity constraints in the hedge fund 
industry. There is a monotonic decrease in portfolio alpha as we move from portfolio Q1 
(smallest funds) to portfolio Q5 (largest funds). Portfolio Q1 achieves an impressive risk-
adjusted return of 7.84 percent per year while portfolio Q5 only delivers a risk-adjusted return of 
2.90 percent per year. The alpha spread between these two portfolios is 4.94 percent per year. 
Noting that the smallest quintile may contain hedge funds that are too small for large institutional 
investors, we also compute the alpha spread between portfolio Q2 and Q5. We find that 
consistent with the convexity of the size/performance relationship, constraining the fund sample 
to larger funds weakens but does not knock out the size effect. It is reassuring to note that the 
spread between Q2 and Q5 is still economically and statistically significant at 2.59 percent per 
year (t-statistic = 4.77).      
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 Given the media’s perennial fascination with large and successful hedge funds19, it is 
tempting for one to conclude that large hedge funds are also successful going forward. The 
results in this paper challenge that view. We show that large hedge funds grapple with significant 
                                                 
19 See, for example, “Paulson & Co. scores again this year” The Wall Street Journal, 24 October 2008, and “Hedge 
fund pay equals Rwanda’s GDP” The Financial Times, 8 April 2008. Understandably, given the current U.S. 
financial turmoil, such media reports have been less forthcoming lately. Large and erstwhile successful funds have 
started chalking up significant losses. See, “Crisis on Wall Street: more pain, less gain for large hedge funds” The 
Wall Street Journal, 26 September 2008.   
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diseconomies of scale, and consequently under perform small hedge funds, ex-post. The 
portfolio of small hedge funds outperforms the portfolio of large hedge funds by 3.65 percent per 
year after adjusting for risk. The capacity constraints are pervasive across the industry and 
cannot be explained by hedge fund database biases, leverage, fund age, and illiquidity-induced 
serial correlation. While the size and performance relationship is convex and strongest in the 
region of small funds, it is not confined to the smallest of funds. We show that such size effects 
are most apparent for funds trading small illiquid securities, i.e., Emerging Market funds and 
funds with high share restrictions, suggesting that price impact may lie at the root of the capacity 
constraints. In addition, we show that the capacity constraints can be partly traced to the 
hierarchy costs proposed by Stein (2002). As a result of hierarchy costs, the underperformance of 
large hedge funds is especially severe for hedge funds managed by multiple principals. These 
principals compete with one another to implement their investment ideas. Since information 
supporting the best investment ideas may not be verifiable, competition amongst principals 
creates organizational diseconomies as the best investment ideas are not always implemented. 
While investors recognize that smaller funds deliver superior returns and direct 
disproportionately more capital towards these funds, their actions do not completely eliminate 
the size effect. 
 Our results also have implications for the nascent literature on hedge funds. Together 
with the reasoning of Berk and Green (2004), they provide support for why Agarwal and Naik 
(2000), Liang (2000), and Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999) find scant evidence of 
performance persistence at annual horizons. They also corroborate evidence by Goetzmann, 
Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) who argue that fund capacity constraints may explain the use of 
incentive fees in the hedge fund industry. Indeed we sharpen their results and show that funds 
who experience greater capacity constraints adopt higher performance fees (and lower 
management fees) than do funds who are able to avoid such constraints. These findings also 
suggest that hedge fund managers are aware of the capacity constraints that they will face prior 
to fund inception. Finally, the size effects documented in this paper help us understand why 
some successful hedge funds close their funds to new investments. 
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Figure 1: Break down of funds by database vendor. Fund numbers in brackets include duplicate share classes of the same fund. The sample period is from January
1994 to June 2008.
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fund size. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two smallest size quintiles. Portfolio B is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two
largest size quintiles. Cumulative abnormal return is the difference between a portfolio's excess return and its factor loadings multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) risk factors.  Factor loadings are estimated over the entire sample period. The sample period is from January 1994 to June 2008.
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Figure 3: The relationship between hedge fund monthly abnormal returns and past assets. Monthly hedge fund abnormal return observations are sorted into 100
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bins based on the funds' past month's assets. For each bin, we calculate the average monthly abnormal return and assets. These average monthly abnormal returns
and assets data are plotted and a quadratic polynomial is fitted through them. Monthly abnormal return is the difference between a fund's excess return and its factor
loadings multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) risk factors.  Factor loadings are estimated over the entire sample period. The sample period is from January 1994 
to June 2008. 
Investment strategy Total funds Dead funds AUM<$20m $20m≤AUM<$100m$100m≤AUM<$500m AUM>$500m Return months
Security Selection 2,715 1,234 1,199 992 410 114 140,710
Multi-process 999 483 349 355 221 74 45,927
Directional Trader 1,752 1,184 885 600 194 73 83,298
Relative Value 1,308 787 474 503 272 59 62,042
Others 643 552 446 155 34 8 26,953
Total 7,417 4,240 3,353 2,605 1,131 328 358,930
Table 1
Summary statistics
The sample period is from January 1994 to June 2008. Funds are grouped according to their primary investment strategy. Security Selection funds take long and short
positions in undervalued and overvalued securities, respectively, and reduce systematic risks in the process. Usually, they take positions in equity markets. Multi-process
funds employ multiple strategies that take advantage of opportunities created by significant transactional events, such as spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy
reorganizations, recapitalizations, and share buybacks. Directional Trader funds bet on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, equities, and bonds in the
futures and cash market. Relative Value funds take positions on spread relations between prices of financial assets and aim to minimize market exposure. AUM is average
assets under management (averaged over time). The total number of funds is 7,417. The total number of dead funds is 4,240. And the total number of fund months with
return information is 358,930
Average AUM in US$
Independent variables
without controls with controls without controls with controls without controls with controls without controls with controls
lagged fund size (US$bn) -0.25** -0.26* -0.22* -0.23* -0.25** -0.29* -0.25** -0.27*
(-3.05) (-2.54) (-2.08) (-2.01) (-2.80) (-2.54) (-3.04) (-2.57)
lagged fund size squared 0.06 0.11* 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.11* 0.05 0.11
(1.66) (2.26) (1.25) (1.62) (1.44) (2.16) (1.43) (2.30)
lagged family size (US$bn) -0.20* -0.16 -0.11 -0.10 -0.21 -0.16 -0.27** -0.20*
(-2.16) (-1.76) (-0.90) (-0.84) (-1.91) (-1.58) (-2.73) (-2.19)
lagged family size squared 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09
(0.88) (0.97) (0.03) (0.05) (0.83) (0.91) (1.08) (1.26)
fund characteristics N Y N Y N Y N Y
style dummies N Y N Y N Y N Y
region dummies N Y N Y N Y N Y
bias-adjusted alpha alpha
Table 2
Fama MacBeth cross-sectional regressions on hedge fund alpha
Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund alpha. The dependent variable is hedge fund monthly alpha. The independent variables are
hedge fund characteristics such as lagged monthly fund size, lagged monthly fund size squared, lagged monthly family size, and lagged monthly family size squared. In the
regressions with controls we also include as independent variables fund management fee, performance fee, redemption period, minimum investment, and fund age in months, as
well as style and geographical region dummies. The t -statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses. The coefficient estimates on the control variables
and dummies are omitted for brevity. The fund and family size variables are in US$bn. The sample period is from January 1994 to June 2008. * Significant at the 5% level; **
Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable
monthly alpha backfill and incubation unsmoothed pre-fee alpha
Portfolio
Mean Ret. 
(pct/ year) Std. Dev.
Alpha (pct/ 
year)
t -stat of 
alpha
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Adj. R2
Portfolio A (small funds) 12.60 6.78 6.62 6.13 0.32 0.27 0.08 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.66
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.95 6.02 2.98 3.19 0.29 0.24 0.07 0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.69
Spread (A-B) 3.65 2.36 3.65 6.64 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.18
Portfolio A (small funds) 10.99 7.08 5.20 4.11 0.30 0.24 0.09 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.55
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.95 5.95 3.05 3.27 0.29 0.22 0.07 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.68
Spread (A-B) 2.04 2.93 2.15 3.07 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.14
Portfolio A (small funds) 12.59 7.46 6.29 5.56 0.38 0.31 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.70
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.89 6.77 2.59 2.56 0.34 0.28 0.09 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.72
Spread (A-B) 3.70 2.45 3.70 6.48 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.18
Portfolio A (small funds) 17.66 6.94 11.66 10.49 0.33 0.27 0.08 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.65
Portfolio B (large funds) 12.83 6.10 6.83 7.22 0.29 0.24 0.06 0.14 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.69
Spread (A-B) 4.83 2.46 4.83 8.44 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.18
Panel D: Pre-fee returns
Table 3
Sorts on fund size
Hedge funds are sorted every January 1st into quintiles based on fund size. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two smallest size quintiles. Portfolio B is the
equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two largest size quintiles. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are
S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond
adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration
(BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are
derived from White (1980) standard errors. The sample period is from January 1994 - June 2008.
Panel A: All funds
Panel B: Adjusted for backfill and incubation bias
Panel C: Adjusted for serial correlation
Portfolio
Mean Ret. 
(pct/ year) Std. Dev.
Alpha (pct/ 
year)
t -stat of 
alpha
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Adj. R2
Portfolio A (small funds) 16.21 9.39 9.16 7.07 0.50 0.41 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.76
Portfolio B (large funds) 10.65 8.72 3.66 3.16 0.46 0.40 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.79
Spread (A-B) 5.56 2.84 5.49 7.93 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.10
Portfolio A (small funds) 12.16 8.30 5.54 3.84 0.37 0.31 0.15 0.19 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.58
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.61 7.97 2.09 1.43 0.34 0.28 0.10 0.21 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.53
Spread (A-B) 3.55 3.21 3.45 4.22 0.03 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
Portfolio A (small funds) 9.42 2.93 4.71 7.88 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.16 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.42
Portfolio B (large funds) 7.45 2.93 2.85 4.57 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.16 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.32
Spread (A-B) 1.97 2.06 1.86 3.56 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03
Portfolio A (small funds) 13.27 6.58 7.22 6.04 0.26 0.25 0.02 0.15 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.52
Portfolio B (large funds) 10.40 4.70 4.82 5.94 0.19 0.18 0.04 0.19 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.60
Spread (A-B) 2.86 4.25 2.40 2.27 0.08 0.07 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.06
Portfolio A (small funds) 7.30 5.70 1.79 1.64 0.20 0.21 0.06 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.48
Portfolio B (large funds) 7.90 5.48 2.26 2.19 0.21 0.18 0.09 0.14 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.50
Spread (A-B) -0.60 2.50 -0.46 -0.78 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.16
Panel D: Multi-process funds
Panel E: Fund of Funds
Table 4
Sorts on fund size stratified by fund investment strategy
Hedge funds are sorted every January 1st into quintiles based on fund size. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two smallest size quintiles. Portfolio B is
the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two largest size quintiles. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors
are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury
bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration
(BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are
derived from White (1980) standard errors. The sample period is from January 1994 - June 2008.
Panel A: Security Selection funds
Panel B: Directional Trader funds
Panel C: Relative Value funds
Portfolio
Mean Ret. 
(pct/ year) Std. Dev.
Alpha (pct/ 
year)
t -stat of 
alpha
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Adj. R2
Portfolio A (small funds) 14.68 6.81 8.36 9.14 0.35 0.30 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.76
Portfolio B (large funds) 9.84 5.50 3.99 5.76 0.29 0.26 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.84
Spread (A-B) 4.85 3.05 4.37 6.06 0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.15
Portfolio A (small funds) 13.01 6.87 7.90 4.91 0.16 0.09 -0.02 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.16
Portfolio B (large funds) 9.91 8.81 3.58 1.91 0.31 0.17 0.09 0.11 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.31
Spread (A-B) 3.10 7.72 4.32 2.28 -0.15 -0.08 -0.11 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.09
Portfolio A (small funds) 10.71 7.27 6.18 4.17 0.16 0.17 0.23 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.40
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.73 5.76 3.47 3.00 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.42
Spread (A-B) 1.98 3.79 2.71 3.35 -0.03 0.02 0.09 -0.09 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.32
Portfolio A (small funds) 24.30 22.99 14.23 2.67 0.69 0.34 -0.25 0.70 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.24
Portfolio B (large funds) 17.52 20.22 6.20 1.38 0.59 0.40 -0.01 0.86 -0.07 0.00 0.03 0.31
Spread (A-B) 6.78 9.96 8.02 3.12 0.10 -0.06 -0.24 -0.16 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.06
Panel D: Emerging Market funds
Table 5
Sorts on fund size stratified by fund investment region
Hedge funds are sorted every January 1st into quintiles based on fund size. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two smallest size quintiles. Portfolio B is the
equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two largest size quintiles. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are
S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond
adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration
(BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are
derived from White (1980) standard errors. The sample period is from January 1994 - June 2008.
Panel A: North America funds
Panel B: Europe funds
Panel C: Global funds
Portfolio
Mean Ret. 
(pct/ year) Std. Dev.
Alpha (pct/ 
year)
t -stat of 
alpha
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Adj. R2
Portfolio A (small funds) 15.20 8.65 8.24 6.94 0.44 0.40 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.75
Portfolio B (large funds) 10.62 7.26 4.00 4.08 0.36 0.33 0.03 0.11 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.76
Spread (A-B) 4.57 3.22 4.24 5.59 0.08 0.07 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.16
Portfolio A (small funds) 11.20 6.22 5.86 5.08 0.25 0.19 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.52
Portfolio B (large funds) 7.96 5.38 2.53 2.53 0.22 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.53
Spread (A-B) 3.24 2.25 3.34 6.63 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.24
Portfolio A (small funds) 15.29 7.66 8.75 7.74 0.37 0.35 -0.01 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.71
Portfolio B (large funds) 10.90 6.85 4.54 4.24 0.31 0.28 0.00 0.19 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.67
Spread (A-B) 4.39 3.05 4.20 5.69 0.06 0.07 -0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.11
Portfolio A (small funds) 12.10 6.89 6.19 5.50 0.32 0.27 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.64
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.35 5.88 2.49 2.63 0.28 0.23 0.09 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.66
Spread (A-B) 3.74 2.75 3.71 5.92 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.22
Panel D: Short redemption notification period funds (<=one month)
Table 6
Sorts on fund size stratified by fund share restrictions
Hedge funds are sorted every January 1st into quintiles based on fund size. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two smallest size quintiles. Portfolio B is the
equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two largest size quintiles. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are
S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond
adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration
(BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are
derived from White (1980) standard errors. The sample period is from January 1994 - June 2008.
Panel A: Low redemption frequency funds (>one month)
Panel B: High redemption frequency funds (<=one month)
Panel C: Long redemption notification period funds ( >one month)
Portfolio
Mean Ret. 
(pct/ year) Std. Dev.
Alpha (pct/ 
year)
t -stat of 
alpha
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Adj. R2
Portfolio A (small funds) 15.53 7.72 9.54 7.01 0.37 0.24 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.56
Portfolio B (large funds) 10.92 6.06 5.09 5.05 0.28 0.22 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.63
Spread (A-B) 4.61 3.72 4.45 4.97 0.09 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.12
Portfolio A (small funds) 16.49 7.20 10.40 8.19 0.32 0.27 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.57
Portfolio B (large funds) 10.46 7.13 3.97 3.46 0.33 0.28 0.04 0.21 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.64
Spread (A-B) 6.04 4.03 6.42 6.16 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
Portfolio A (small funds) 15.40 7.34 9.30 7.50 0.34 0.25 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.60
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.59 4.90 2.96 3.51 0.23 0.14 0.11 0.16 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.61
Spread (A-B) 6.80 4.72 6.35 5.76 0.12 0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.18
Table 7
Sorts on fund size stratified by number of principals
Hedge funds are sorted every January 1st into quintiles based on fund size. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two smallest size quintiles. Portfolio B is the
equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two largest size quintiles. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are
S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond
adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration
(BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are
derived from White (1980) standard errors. The sample period is from January 1994 - June 2008.
Panel A: Funds with one principal
Panel B: Funds with two principals
Panel C: Funds with more than two principals
Portfolio
Mean Ret. 
(pct/ year) Std. Dev.
Alpha (pct/ 
year)
t -stat of 
alpha
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Adj. R2
Portfolio A (small funds) 12.45 10.28 8.54 3.90 0.15 0.18 0.31 -0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.33
Portfolio B (large funds) 10.37 9.65 6.52 3.11 0.10 0.14 0.32 -0.06 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.30
Spread (A-B) 2.08 4.33 2.02 1.84 0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03
Portfolio A (small funds) 12.77 6.82 6.58 6.43 0.34 0.29 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.71
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.89 6.21 2.73 2.92 0.30 0.26 0.06 0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.71
Spread (A-B) 3.89 2.33 3.85 6.94 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.14
Portfolio A (small funds) 13.83 6.76 8.00 7.13 0.31 0.26 0.07 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.63
Portfolio B (large funds) 9.30 5.72 3.55 3.89 0.26 0.24 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.66
Spread (A-B) 4.54 2.44 4.45 7.85 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.19
Portfolio A (small funds) 8.91 7.56 2.41 2.13 0.39 0.29 0.07 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.70
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.25 7.52 1.51 1.26 0.37 0.25 0.07 0.22 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.68
Spread (A-B) 0.66 3.29 0.90 1.13 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.12
Panel D: Low performance fee funds (performance fee < 20%)
Table 8
Sorts on fund size stratified by fund fee
Hedge funds are sorted every January 1st into quintiles based on fund size. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two smallest size quintiles. Portfolio B is
the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two largest size quintiles. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors
are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury
bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration
(BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are
derived from White (1980) standard errors. The sample period is from January 1994 - June 2008.
Panel A: High management fee funds (management fee > 2%)
Panel B: Low management fee funds (management fee <=2%)
Panel C: High performance fee funds (performance fee >= 20%)
Portfolio
Mean Ret. 
(pct/ year) Std. Dev.
Alpha (pct/ 
year)
t -stat of 
alpha
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Adj. R2
Portfolio A (small funds) 12.02 6.80 5.66 6.02 0.37 0.27 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.76
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.53 6.55 2.25 2.22 0.33 0.24 0.04 0.12 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.67
Spread (A-B) 3.49 2.55 3.40 5.42 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08
Portfolio A (small funds) 11.66 6.09 5.84 6.13 0.28 0.29 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.69
Portfolio B (large funds) 8.63 5.80 2.83 3.01 0.28 0.22 0.06 0.11 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.65
Spread (A-B) 3.02 1.99 3.01 6.34 0.00 0.07 0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.14
Portfolio Q1 (smallest) 13.80 7.24 7.84 6.37 0.32 0.27 0.10 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.60
Portfolio Q2 11.49 6.57 5.49 5.39 0.32 0.26 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.68
Portfolio Q3 10.45 6.07 4.51 4.82 0.30 0.25 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.70
Portfolio Q4 9.25 6.42 3.05 3.16 0.31 0.28 0.08 0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.71
Portfolio Q5 (largest) 8.65 5.76 2.90 3.05 0.27 0.20 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.64
Spread (Q1-Q5) 5.15 3.40 4.94 6.16 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.16
Spread (Q2-Q5) 2.84 2.36 2.59 4.77 0.05 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.20
Table 9
Sorts on fund size, robustness tests
Hedge funds are sorted every January 1st into quintiles based on fund size. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two smallest size quintiles. Portfolio B is
the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the two largest size quintiles. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors
are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury
bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration
(BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are
derived from White (1980) standard errors. The sample period is from January 1994 - June 2008.
Panel A: Unleveraged funds
Panel B: Funds with AUM > US$20m
Panel C: Quintile portfolios
